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Energy efficiency and conservation are considered key means for reducing greenhouse gas emissions
and achieving other energy policy goals, but associated market behavior and policy responses have
engendered debates in the economic literature. We review economic concepts underlying consumer
decision making in energy efficiency and conservation and examine related empirical literature. In
particular, we provide an economic perspective on the range of market barriers, market failures, and
behavioral failures that have been cited in the energy efficiency context. We assess the extent to which
these conditions provide a motivation for policy intervention in energy-using product markets, including
an examination of the evidence on policy effectiveness and cost. Although theory and empirical evidence
suggests there is potential for welfare-enhancing energy efficiency policies, many open questions remain,
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Energy efficiency and conservation have long been critical elements in the energy policy 
dialogue, and they have taken on a renewed importance as concerns about global climate change 
and energy security have intensified. Many advocates and policy makers hold that reducing the 
demand for energy is essential to meeting these challenges, and analyses tend to find that 
demand reductions can be a cost-effective means of addressing these concerns. With such great 
policy interest, a significant literature has developed over the past 30 years, providing an 
economic framework for addressing energy efficiency and conservation, as well as empirical 
estimates of how consumers respond to policies to reduce the demand for energy. 
We begin by defining a few terms to put the literature in context. First, it is important to 
conceptualize energy as an input into the production of desired energy services (e.g., heating, 
lighting, motion), rather than as an end in itself. In this framework, energy efficiency is typically 
defined as the energy services provided per unit of energy input. For example, the energy 
efficiency of an air conditioner is the amount of heat removed from air per kilowatt-hour (kWh) 
of electricity input. At the individual product level, energy efficiency can be thought of as one of 
a bundle of product characteristics, alongside product cost and other attributes (Newell et al. 
1999). At a more aggregate level, the energy efficiency of a sector or of the economy as a whole 
can be measured as the level of gross domestic product per unit of energy consumed in its 
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production (for analyses of the determinants of energy intensity at the state and national levels, 
see, for example, Metcalf 2008, Sue Wing 2008). 
In contrast, energy conservation is typically defined as a reduction in the total amount of 
energy consumed. Thus, energy conservation may or may not be associated with an increase in 
energy efficiency, depending on how energy services change. That is, energy consumption may 
be reduced with or without an increase in energy efficiency, and energy consumption may 
increase alongside an increase in energy efficiency. These distinctions are important when 
considering issues such as the “rebound effect,” whereby the demand for energy services may 
increase in response to energy efficiency–induced declines in the marginal cost of energy 
services. The distinction is also important in understanding the short- versus long-run price 
elasticity of energy demand, whereby short-run changes may depend principally on changes in 
consumption of energy services, whereas longer-run changes include greater alterations of the 
energy efficiency of the equipment stock. 
One must also distinguish between energy efficiency and economic efficiency. 
Maximizing economic efficiency—typically operationalized as maximizing net benefits to 
society—is generally not going to imply maximizing energy efficiency, which is a physical 
concept and comes at a cost. An important issue arises, however, regarding whether private 
economic decisions about the level of energy efficiency chosen for products are economically 
efficient. This will depend on the economic efficiency of the market conditions the consumer 
faces (e.g., energy prices, information availability) as well as the economic behavior of the 
individual decision maker (e.g., cost-minimizing behavior). 
Market conditions may depart from efficiency if there are market failures, such as 
environmental externalities or imperfect information. Aside from such market failures, most 3 
economic analysis of energy efficiency has taken cost-minimizing (or utility/profit-maximizing) 
behavior by households and firms as a point of departure in analysis. Some literature, however, 
has focused more closely on the decision-making behavior of economic actors, identifying 
potential “behavioral failures” that lead to deviations from cost minimization and motivated at 
least partly by results from the field of behavioral economics. Much of the economic literature on 
energy efficiency therefore seeks to conceptualize energy efficiency decision making, to identify 
the degree to which market or behavioral failures may present an opportunity for net-beneficial 
policy interventions, and to evaluate the realized effectiveness and cost of actual policies. 
This line of research has important implications both for assessing the cost of correcting 
market failures—such as environmental externalities—and for clarifying the role of policies that 
are oriented toward the correction of behavioral failures. For example, if behavioral failures lead 
to underinvestment in energy efficiency, then some reductions in energy-related emissions could 
be available at low or even negative cost. At the same time, policies that provide an efficient 
means of correcting environmental externalities—such as an emissions price—may not be well 
suited to inducing these relatively low-cost energy and emission reductions. In principle, a set of 
policies addressing both market and behavioral failures could, therefore, potentially provide a 
more efficient overall response. In practice, the value of individual policy components depends 
on the extent of existing market problems and the ability of specific policies to correct these 
problems in a net beneficial manner. 
This article views the literature through this perspective and begins by introducing the 
notion of energy efficiency as an investment in producing energy services. After presenting 
evidence of energy market influences on energy efficiency, we then turn to identifying and 
examining empirical evidence on a range of market and behavioral failures that have been 4 
discussed in the energy efficiency literature. We then address the implications of this evidence 
for policy interventions and briefly review the empirical evidence on the effectiveness and cost 
of policy, including price policies and information policies. Finally, we provide overall 
conclusions. We limit the scope of this study primarily to energy efficiency and conservation in 
buildings and appliances and do not address transportation in detail. Nonetheless, most of the 
same conceptual and empirical issues carry over to transportation as well. 
2. ENERGY EFFICIENCY AS AN INVESTMENT IN PRODUCING ENERGY 
SERVICES 
From an economic perspective, energy efficiency choices fundamentally involve investment 
decisions that trade off higher initial capital costs and uncertain lower future energy operating 
costs. In the simplest case, the initial cost is the difference between the purchase and installation 
cost of a relatively energy-efficient product and the cost of an otherwise equivalent product that 
provides the same energy services but uses more energy. The decision of whether to make the 
energy-efficient investment requires weighing this initial capital cost against the expected future 
savings. Assessing the future savings requires forming expectations of future energy prices, 
changes in other operating costs related to the energy use (e.g., pollution charges), intensity of 
use of the product, and equipment lifetime. Comparing these expected future cash flows against 
the initial cost requires discounting the future cash flows to present values. Holding consumption 
of energy services constant, a privately optimal decision would entail choosing the level of 
energy efficiency to minimize the present value of private costs, whereas economic efficiency at 
a societal level would entail minimizing social costs. This makes energy efficiency different in 
character from many other product attributes for which there may not be a well-defined notion of 
what constitutes optimal or “rational” behavior on the part of the individual. 5 
This conceptualization of the problem maps directly into a production function 
framework, where capital and energy are viewed as inputs into the production of energy services. 
Along an isoquant describing a given level of energy services, the cost-minimizing level of 
energy use (and thus energy efficiency) is found at the point of tangency where the marginal 
increase in capital cost with respect to energy reduction is equal to their relative price (in present-
value terms) (Figure 1). As described above, the relative price will depend on the capital cost of 
efficiency improvements, the discount rate, expected energy prices, equipment utilization, and 
decision-time horizon. This framework applies at the household level as well as at a broad 









Focusing on the household level as an example, greater energy efficiency can be driven 
by market forces in two ways within this production function framework. First, households may 
move along the energy-services isoquant by substituting capital for energy in response to a 
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change modeling. For a review of literature devoted to this topic, which is beyond the scope of this paper, see 
Gillingham et al. (2008). 
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change in relative prices (Figure 1a, with relative prices changing from P0 to P1). Second, 
technological change that shifts the isoquant in a way favoring (i.e., biased toward) greater 
energy efficiency (Figure 1b, with isoquant0 shifting to isoquant1) could change the production 
possibilities available to households. In contrast, energy conservation not driven by energy 
efficiency improvements would be associated with a lower level of energy services (i.e., a lesser 
isoquant). 
Market failures can be represented within this framework as a divergence of the relative 
prices used for private decisions from the economically efficient prices. For example, both 
unpriced environmental externalities and missing information on the energy intensity of product 
use would tend to lower the relative price of energy, leading to choices of inefficiently low 
energy efficiency (e.g., P0 compared with P1 in Figure 1a). Note that this framework presupposes 
optimizing behavior by the consumer, given available information—an assumption subject to 
debate within the behavioral economics literature, as discussed below. 
The next section further explores the role of energy markets in governing energy 
efficiency decisions. Section 4 then identifies potential market and behavioral failures that may 
lead to suboptimal decisions. 
3. ENERGY MARKET INFLUENCES ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
Energy markets and market prices influence consumer decisions regarding how much energy to 
consume and whether to invest in more energy-efficient products and equipment. An increase in 
energy prices will result in some energy conservation in the short run; however, short-run 
changes in energy efficiency tend to be limited owing to the long lifetimes and slow turnover of 
energy-using appliances and capital equipment. Nonetheless, if an energy price increase is 7 
persistent, it also is more likely to significantly affect energy efficiency adoption, as consumers 
replace older capital equipment and firms have time to develop new products and processes. 
The extent of demand responsiveness to changes in price is captured in the price elasticity 
of energy demand. Table 1 presents the ranges of energy own-price elasticity estimates in the 
literature. Long-run price elasticities are larger than short-run elasticities, corresponding to more  
Table 1  Ranges of estimates of energy own-price elasticities
a 
 
  Short run  Long run 
Range References  Range  References 
Residential        
Electricity  0.14–0.44  Dahl (1993)  0.32–1.89  Bernstein & Griffin (2005),  
Hsing (1994) 
Natural gas  0.03–0.76  Bohi & Zimmerman 
(1984), Dahl (1993) 
0.26–1.47
b  Bohi & Zimmerman (1984), 
Dahl(1993) 
Fuel oil  0.15–0.34  Wade (2003)  0.53–0.75  Dahl (1993), Wade (2003) 
Commercial       
Electricity  0–0.46  Dahl (1993),   0.24–1.36  Wade (2003), Dahl (1993) 
Natural gas  0.14–0.29  Dahl (1993), Wade 
(2003) 
0.40–1.38  Wade (2003), Bohi & 
Zimmerman (1984),  
Fuel oil  0.13–0.49  Dahl (1993), Wade 
(2003) 
0.39–3.5  Wade (2003), Newell & Pizer 
(2008) 
Industrial       
Electricity 0.11–0.28  Bohi  &  Zimmerman 
(1984), Dahl (1993) 
0.22–3.26  Bohi & Zimmerman (1984), 
Dahl (1993) 
Natural gas
b 0.51–0.62  Bohi  &  Zimmerman 
(1984) 
0.89–2.92  Dahl (1993), Bohi & 
Zimmerman (1984) 
Fuel oil  0.11  Dahl (1993)  0.5–1.57
c  Bohi & Zimmerman (1984) 
aAbsolute values shown; all values are negative.  
bEstimates drawn largely from regional studies. 
bEstimates for 19 states. 
 
energy efficiency improvements as capital turns over. On average, natural gas price elasticities 
are greater than electricity or fuel oil elasticities. Note that, because they are based on actual 
consumer behavior, these price elasticity estimates include any increase in consumption of 
energy services that might occur in response to a lower unit cost of energy services resulting 
from increased energy efficiency (i.e., the rebound effect). 8 
Other studies have focused specifically on factors influencing technology adoption, 
finding that higher energy prices are associated with significantly greater adoption of energy-
efficient equipment (Anderson & Newell 2004, Hassett & Metcalf 1995, Jaffe et al. 1995). 
Further upstream in the technology development process, Newell et al. (1999) and Popp (2002) 
found energy-efficient innovation is also significantly determined by energy prices (for a review, 
see Popp et al. 2009). Empirical estimates, therefore, demonstrate a substantial degree of 
responsiveness of energy utilization as well as energy-efficient technology adoption and 
innovation to changes in energy price. 
4. POTENTIAL MARKET AND BEHAVIORAL FAILURES 
Much of the literature on energy efficiency focuses on elucidating the potential rationales for 
policy intervention and evaluating the effectiveness and cost of such interventions in practice. 
Within this literature, there is a long-standing debate surrounding the commonly cited “energy 
efficiency gap.” There are several ways to view this gap. At its core, the gap refers to a 
significant difference between observed levels of energy efficiency and some notion of optimal 
energy use (Jaffe et al. 2004). That notion of optimal energy use has at times focused on 
maximizing physical energy efficiency, which will not generally coincide with maximal 
economic efficiency because energy efficiency comes at a cost. Within the investment 
framework described above, the energy efficiency gap takes the form of underinvestment in 
energy efficiency relative to a description of the socially optimal level of energy efficiency. Such 
underinvestment is also sometimes described as an observed rate or probability of adoption of 
energy-efficient technologies that is “too slow.” 
Often, the efficiency gap is illustrated by a comparison of the market discount rate and 
relatively high “implicit discount rates” that are implied by consumer choices over appliances 9 
with different costs and energy efficiencies (Hausman 1979). The empirical evidence is 
relatively well established; in a number of studies published primarily in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, analysts using a variety of methodologies found implicit discount rates ranging from 25% 
to over 100% (Sanstad et al. 2006, Train 1985). 
Economists have posited a number of explanations to account for part or all of the 
apparent gap: hidden costs not accounted for by the analyst, including search costs as well as 
reductions in other product attributes (e.g., lighting quality) (Jaffe et al. 2004); lower energy 
savings than assumed by the analyst, owing in part to heterogeneity of consumers (Hausman & 
Joskow 1982); uncertain future energy savings implying rational consumers should put more 
weight on the initial cost (Sutherland 1991); the irreversibility of energy efficiency investments 
and the associated option value of waiting to invest (Hassett & Metcalf 1993, 1995; van Soest & 
Bulte 2000); and the possibility that consumers are appropriately forming expectations about 
future energy prices but energy analysts are using incorrect proxies for these expectations (Jaffe 
et al. 2004). For example, studies have found that actual savings from past utility-sponsored 
programs achieved 50%–80% of predicted savings (Hirst 1986, Sebold & Fox 1985), although a 
more recent study by Auffhammer et al. (2008) suggests that utilities have improved their 
abilities to predict savings. Similarly, Metcalf & Hassett (1999) found that, once all costs are 
accounted for, the realized return to attic insulation is much below the returns promised by 
engineers and manufacturers, and at 9.7%, it is consistent with the interest rate suggested by 
standard investment theory. Others have argued that the energy efficiency gap must not exist 
because rational optimizing consumers would not be willing to ignore large benefits—the 
proverbial $20 bill on the sidewalk (Sutherland 1996). 10 
Conversely, other papers that examined these explanations for why there may not be a 
gap found some of them lacking. Metcalf (1994) found that the uncertainty of future energy 
savings described in Sutherland (1991) should actually lead a rational investor to require a rate of 
return that is lower than the market discount rate, because energy efficiency investments will 
tend to serve as a hedge against other risks. Sanstad et al. (1995) showed that the option value 
analysis of Hassett & Metcalf (1993, 1995) suggests an implicit discount rate much lower than 
observed implicit discount rates, even when taking irreversibility into account. Howarth & 
Sanstad (1995) discussed heterogeneity and hidden costs as possible concerns, but they 
suggested that analysts are cognizant of these issues and are careful to take them into account. 
For example, Koomey & Sanstad (1994) paid close attention to confounding factors such as 
heterogeneity and hidden costs and still found high implicit discount rates for efficient ballasts 
for commercial lighting and consumer purchases of refrigerators. 
Other papers focus on distinguishing market barriers to the adoption of energy-efficient 
technologies from market failures. Market barriers can be defined as any disincentives to the 
adoption or use of a good (Jaffe et al. 2004). Market barriers may or may not be market failures 
in the traditional welfare economic sense. Potential market barriers described in the broader 
energy efficiency literature occasionally include such factors as low energy prices, fluctuating 
energy prices, or high technology costs, which are clearly not market failures on their own. 
Systematic biases in consumer decision making that lead to underinvestment in energy efficiency 
relative to the cost-minimizing level are also often included among market barriers. Following 
the review by Shogren & Taylor (2008) of behavioral economics, however, we classify these 
biases as “behavioral failures.” In the present context, we consider behavioral failures to 
represent consumer behavior that is inconsistent with utility maximization or, in the current 11 
context, with energy-service cost minimization. In contrast, market failure analysis is distinct in 
presupposing individual rationality and instead focusing on the conditions surrounding 
interactions among economic agents and society. 
There is an economic rationale for policies to correct market barriers if they represent 
market or behavioral failures (Shogren & Taylor 2008). Table 2 provides a summary of potential 
market and behavioral failures relating to energy efficiency and conservation, along with policy 
responses that have been implemented, or could be implemented, to address these problems in 
cases where they are found to be significant. We focus on the most commonly raised market and 
behavioral failures but do not prejudge whether they are empirically significant problems for 
energy efficiency and conservation.
3 The remainder of this section discusses each of these 
potential concerns in turn. Then in Section 5, we review experience with policies that have been 
proposed and implemented, in part, as a response to these concerns. 
 
4.1 Energy Market Failures 
The common theme in energy market failures is that energy prices do not reflect the true 
marginal social cost of energy consumption, either through environmental externalities, average-
cost pricing, or national security. Environmental externalities associated with the production and 
consumption of many sources of energy lead to emissions of greenhouse gases and other air 
pollutants resulting in costs that are borne by others—that is, they are not internalized by the 
individual energy consumer. Absent policy, an environmental externality leads to an overuse of 
energy relative to the social optimum and, hence, underinvestment in energy efficiency and 
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Table 2  Commonly cited market and behavioral failures relevant to energy efficiency 
along with potential policy responses 
 
Potential market failures  Potential policy options 
Energy market failures   
 Environmental externalities  Emissions pricing (tax, cap and trade) 
 Average-cost electricity pricing  Real-time pricing, market pricing 
 Energy security  Energy taxation, strategic reserves 
Capital market failures   
 Liquidity constraints  Financing/loan programs 
Innovation market failures   
 R&D spillovers
a  R&D tax credits, public funding 
 Learning-by-doing spillovers  Incentives for early market adoption 
Information problems   
 Lack of information, asymmetric information  Information programs 
 Principal-agent problems  Information programs 
 Learning by using  Information programs 
Potential behavioral failures  Potential policy options 
 Prospect theory  Education, information, product standards 
 Bounded rationality  Education, information, product standards 
 Heuristic decision making  Education, information, product standards 
aR&D, research and development. 
 
conservation. Although there is no debate over the existence of environmental externalities, the 
magnitude of such externalities and their degree of internalization is uncertain and hard to 
measure. Gillingham et al. (2006) reviewed the literature on environmental externalities from the 
production of electricity and found that past policies to reduce electricity use provided monetized 
benefits from the reduction in CO2, nitrous oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and fine 
particulate matter (PM10) that were on the order of 10% of the direct value of the electricity 
savings. Environmental externalities, largely in the form of air emissions, also exist with other 
fossil fuels, such as home-heating oil or propane. To the extent that energy prices do not 
currently internalize these externalities (which varies by pollution type), the market will provide 
a level of energy efficiency that is too low from a societal point of view. The economically 13 
optimal policy response is to price emissions, which will indirectly stimulate greater energy 
efficiency. 
Prices faced by consumers in electricity markets also may not reflect marginal social 
costs due to the common use of average-cost pricing under utility regulation. Average-cost 
pricing could lead to under- or overuse of electricity relative to the economic optimum. On one 
hand, to the extent that average costs are above marginal costs as a result of amortized fixed 
costs, consumers face a price above the economically optimal price, thus encouraging underuse 
of electricity. On the other hand, average-cost prices depend on the average cost of the mix of 
generators used to produce electricity. Market-based pricing produces daily or hourly wholesale 
prices that reflect the cost of the marginal generator and retail prices that typically reflect the 
average of these marginal costs over a period of months. Time-of-use (TOU) prices vary in a 
preset manner by time of day or season, whereas real-time pricing (RTP) directly conveys 
information about the current marginal cost of generation and transmission in the price, updated 
at an hourly or even more frequent basis. If consumers face prices that are at times too low (peak 
times) and at other times too high (off-peak), they will overuse electricity during the peak times 
and underuse it during the off-peak relative to the social optimum (Joskow & Tirole 2007). 
RTP and, to a lesser degree, TOU pricing can partly alleviate this market failure (which 
could alternatively be described as a policy failure). Of course, the cost of implementing TOU 
pricing or RTP may exceed the benefits, and there may be other market failures related to the 
adoption of real-time meters (Brennan 2004). However, recent evidence from the Anaheim 
Critical Peak Pricing Experiment suggests that, with recent technology advances, a variation of 
RTP implemented during peak periods has significant potential to improve social welfare, with 
little effect on use in off-peak periods (Wolak 2006). Whether there would be conservation of 14 
total energy use with a comprehensive RTP scheme during all time periods is less clear. 
Similarly, the effect of TOU pricing or RTP on energy efficiency investments is unclear and 
would depend on the pricing that exists during the time those investments would be used. 
Some authors have suggested that there are national security external costs from the 
United States’ dependence on certain energy sources—particularly oil from unstable regions of 
the world—that consumers do not face in energy prices or therefore take into account in their 
energy-use decisions (Bohi & Toman 1996, Bohi & Zimmerman 1984). Although these concerns 
are associated primarily with transportation-related consumption of oil, they are relevant to 
building energy consumption through fuel oil consumption for heating and the association 
between natural gas and oil markets. Economic and other analyses of the national security risks 
of energy consumption is not entirely satisfying, in part because of the lumpiness of the problem. 
On the margin, reducing oil consumption would not likely change the associated security risks, 
nor the military and diplomatic expenditures undertaken in response. Nonetheless, a long-term 
larger reduction may reduce these risks, and to the extent that these risks are not fully reflected in 
the price of relevant energy resources, there will be a resulting underinvestment in energy 
efficiency. 
4.2 Information Problems 
Information problems are consistently raised in the energy efficiency literature and, along with 
behavioral failures, are often given as the primary explanation for the energy efficiency gap 
(Sanstad et al. 2006). Specific information problems cited include consumers’ lack of 
information about the availability of and savings from energy-efficient products, asymmetric 
information, principal-agent or split-incentive problems, and externalities associated with 
learning by using. The following descriptions take the consumers’ perspective, but several of 15 
these same information problems have been studied in the context of decision making by firms 
(DeCanio 1993, 1994a,b; DeCanio & Watkins 1998; Stein 2003). As discussed in Section 5, if 
such problems are significant and correctable, they may warrant labeling and other information 
programs. 
Lack of information and asymmetric information are often given as reasons why 
consumers systematically underinvest in energy efficiency. The idea is that consumers often lack 
sufficient information about the difference in future operating costs between more-efficient and 
less-efficient goods necessary to make proper investment decisions (Howarth & Sanstad 1995). 
This argument can be consistent with cost-minimizing behavior, if we assume that under perfect 
information consumers would reach a privately optimal outcome. Alternatively, information 
problems may occur when there are behavioral failures, so that consumers are not appropriately 
taking into account future reductions in energy costs when making present investments in energy 
efficiency. We discuss information problems in the context of behavioral failures in Section 5. 
Asymmetric information, where one party involved in a transaction has more information 
than another, may lead to adverse selection (Akerlof 1970). In the context of energy efficiency, 
adverse selection could imply that sellers of energy-efficient technologies that would provide 
clear ex post benefits to consumers are unable to perfectly transfer this information to buyers if 
the energy efficiency is unobserved (Howarth & Sanstad 1995). The sellers of every product 
would have an incentive to suggest that the energy efficiency of the product is high, but because 
the buyers cannot observe the energy efficiency, they may ignore it in their decision. The model 
by Howarth & Andersson (1993), which incorporates explicit transaction costs of transferring 
information, formally describes how this circumstance could lead to an underinvestment in 16 
energy efficiency. Whereas transaction costs in this context may be a source of market failure, 
transaction costs in general may be legitimate and not a reason for intervening in markets. 
The principal-agent or split-incentive problem describes a situation where one party (the 
agent), such as a builder or landlord, decides the level of energy efficiency in a building, while a 
second party (the principal), such as the purchaser or tenant, pays the energy bills. When the 
principal has incomplete information about the energy efficiency of the building, the first party 
may not be able to recoup the costs of energy efficiency investments in the purchase price or rent 
charged for the building. The agent will then underinvest in energy efficiency relative to the 
social optimum, resulting in a market failure (Jaffe & Stavins 1994). Murtishaw & Sathaye 
(2006) attempted to quantify the magnitude of the principal-agent problem for four end uses: 
space heating, refrigerators, water heating, and lighting. They found that the principal-agent 
problem is potentially relevant to 25% of refrigerator energy use, 66% of water heating energy 
use, 48% of space heating energy use, and 2% of lighting energy use, although they did not 
quantify the degree to which energy efficiency decisions in these cases have actually been 
inefficient. Levinson & Niemann (2004) found that tenants whose electric bills are included in 
their rental contracts consume significantly greater energy than tenants who pay their own 
electric bills. 
Positive externalities associated with learning by using can exist where the adopter of a 
new energy-efficient product creates knowledge about the product through its use, and others 
freely benefit from the information generated about the existence, characteristics, and 
performance of the product. This phenomenon is not unique to energy efficiency (Jaffe et al. 
2004). In the context of demand-side management programs, some studies have distinguished 
learning-by-using spillovers into “free drivers” and program spillovers (Blumstein & Harris 17 
1993, Eto et al. 1996). Free drivers are nonparticipants who install energy-efficient products as a 
result of hearing about them from program participants. Program spillovers occur when the 
participating household installs additional energy-efficient products, without rebates, as a result 
of the information they learned through participation in the program. 
4.3 Liquidity Constraints in Capital Markets 
Blumstein et al. (1980) first described liquidity constraints that hinder access to financing for 
energy-efficient investments as a market barrier. Some purchasers of equipment may choose the 
less energy-efficient product owing to lack of access to credit, resulting in underinvestment in 
energy efficiency and reflected in an implicit discount rate that is above typical market levels. 
This effect is a variation of a market failure associated with a lack of access to capital that is 
widely discussed in the development economics literature, and it applies to any capital-intensive 
investment, not just energy-efficient products (Ray 1998). The extent to which liquidity 
constraints are an issue in energy efficiency has yet to be established empirically. Some evidence 
indicates that only a small percentage of home improvements are funded by loans, which could 
imply liquidity constraints are important for only a small fraction of energy efficiency 
investments or that liquidity constraints effectively force most energy efficiency investments to 
be self-financed (Berry 1984). 
In industry and government, a common financing constraint is the institutional disconnect 
between capital and operating budgets, but energy-services performance contracts have 
developed to fill this niche. In some cases, such as for industrial customers, energy-service 
providers pay the capital cost and receive a share of the resulting savings. In other cases, such as 
for government and institutional customers, the customer can borrow at a lower interest rate than 
the energy-service provider, so it makes greater financial sense for the customer to make the 18 
investment. In such cases, the energy-service providers recommend energy efficiency 
improvements, guarantee the operating cost savings, and pay the difference if those savings are 
not realized—often allowing for the repayment of the capital cost to be treated as an operating 
expense (Zobler & Hatcher 2003). In addition, if liquidity constraints are an issue for energy 
efficiency investments, then they will also constrain other types of investments, and any potential 
solution would have to reach well beyond energy efficiency policy. 
Golove & Eto (1996) described a case of asymmetric information where consumers are 
unable to transfer information to their lenders about the relative certainty of operating cost 
savings from an efficiency investment. Thus, the lender cannot determine the likelihood of 
repayment and is less likely to approve of the loan. Golove & Eto claimed the resulting credit 
constraints imply that consumers should be given a lower interest rate than lenders are willing to 
offer, and thus consumers faced with the higher interest rate may underinvest in energy 
efficiency. The extent of this potential problem has not been measured empirically to our 
knowledge, and this problem of information transfer may apply to other costs as well, possibly 
altering the result. Energy-efficient mortgages from some lenders address this problem by 
crediting a home’s energy efficiency when determining the interest rate or the size of the 
mortgage. Warranties may also address this problem privately. 
4.4 Innovation Market Failures 
R&D spillovers may lead to underinvestment in energy-efficient technology innovation owing to 
the public good nature of knowledge, whereby individual firms are unable to capture the full 
benefits from their innovation efforts, which instead accrue partly to other firms and consumers. 
This is not particular to energy efficiency innovation; rather, it is a general feature of 
technological innovation, which manifests empirically as a social rate of return to R&D that is 19 
approximately two to four times higher than the private rate of return (Griliches 1995, Hall 1996, 
Nadiri 1993). If energy is underpriced relative to the social optimum, this innovation problem 
will be magnified in the context of energy-saving technologies (Goulder & Schneider 1999, Jaffe 
et al. 2005, Schneider & Goulder 1997). 
Learning by doing (LBD) refers to the empirical observation that, as cumulative 
production of new technologies increases, the cost of production tends to decline as the firm 
learns from experience how to reduce its costs (Arrow 1962). LBD may be associated with a 
market failure if the learning creates knowledge that spills over to other firms in the industry, 
lowering the costs for others without compensation to the original investing firm (Fischer & 
Newell 2008, van Benthem et al. 2008). In the energy context, LBD processes have been 
empirically investigated and applied primarily to fledgling low-carbon electricity-generating 
technologies in the context of energy and climate policy modeling. The empirical evidence on 
learning in terms of energy-using equipment is very limited, and what does exist focuses 
generally on product cost reductions rather than learning specifically with respect to improving 
energy efficiency (see, e.g., Bass 1980). It is also difficult to empirically distinguish learning 
from other factors that affect product costs and prices. Further research is needed to examine 
learning in energy-efficient technologies and ascertain the degree to which the learning spills 
over to other firms. The potential for positive externalities from LBD is not unique to energy: It 
may occur with any new technology that displays nonappropriable learning characteristics. 
4.5 Behavioral Failures 
The behavioral economics literature has drawn attention to several systematic biases in consumer 
decision making that may be relevant to decisions regarding investment in energy efficiency. 
Similar insights can be gained from the literature on energy decision making in psychology and 20 
sociology (e.g., see Stern 1985; Lutzenhiser 1992, 1993). Frameworks incorporating such 
departures from perfect rationality have intuitive psychological appeal as well as an empirical 
basis from behavioral economic and psychological studies. The crucial question is whether these 
deviations from perfect rationality lead to significant systematic biases in energy efficiency 
decision making, and if so, whether these biases lead to under- or overinvestment in energy 
efficiency. Due to the limited economics literature in this area, in many cases we reference 
literature from other social sciences that bears directly on energy consumption–related behavior. 
The behavioral economics literature draws upon cognitive psychology and other 
disciplines to inform experimental and theoretical analyses aimed at understanding how 
consumers make decisions. Behavioral economists tend to relax the classical microeconomic 
assumption of rational choice and replace it with bounded rationality or other heuristic decision-
making methods (McFadden 1999). Behavioral economics has been motivated by evidence that 
consumers are not perfectly rational—even if they are given perfect information—and has 
developed a positive theory designed to understand how consumers make decisions in practice. 
In the energy efficiency context, the most relevant and common rationality assumption is that of 
behavior that minimizes present-value costs for a given level of energy-service provision. 
The evidence that consumer decisions are not always perfectly rational is quite strong, 
beginning with the research by Tversky & Kahneman indicating that both sophisticated and 
naïve respondents will consistently violate axioms of rational choice in certain situations (e.g., 
see Tversky & Kahneman 1974, Kahneman & Tversky 1979). Since then, an entire literature has 
developed examining when and how people violate the axioms of rational choice. Surveys of this 
literature of behavioral decision theory include Camerer (1997), McFadden (1999), Machina 
(1989), Rabin (1997), and Thaler (1991). Shogren & Taylor (2008) and List & Price (2009) 21 
provide reviews specifically in the context of resource and environmental economics. Our review 
follows the primary theme of behavioral economics by focusing on consumer decisions. Firms 
may also face some of the same issues, although competitive forces serve to moderate the 
significance of behavioral failures for firms (Shogren & Taylor 2008). 
The three primary themes that emerge from behavioral economics and have been applied 
in the context of energy efficiency are prospect theory, bounded rationality, and heuristic 
decision making. The prospect theory of decision making under uncertainty posits that the 
welfare change from gains and losses is evaluated with respect to a reference point, usually the 
status quo. In addition, consumers are risk averse with respect to gains and risk seeking with 
respect to losses, so that the welfare change is much greater from a loss than from an expected 
gain of the same magnitude (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). This can lead to loss aversion, 
anchoring, status quo bias, and other anomalous behavior (Shogren & Taylor 2008). 
Bounded rationality suggests that consumers are rational but face cognitive constraints in 
processing information that lead to deviations from rationality in certain circumstances (Simon 
1959, 1986). Heuristic decision making is related closely to bounded rationality and 
encompasses a variety of decision-making strategies that differ in some critical way from 
conventional utility maximization in order to reduce the cognitive burden of decision making. 
For example, Tversky (1972) developed the theory of elimination by aspects, wherein consumers 
use a sequential decision-making process where they first narrow their full choice set to a smaller 
set by eliminating products that do not have some desired feature or aspect (e.g., cost above a 
certain level), and then they optimize among the smaller choice set, possibly after eliminating 
further products. 22 
Not much economic literature empirically tests these behavioral hypotheses to uncover 
whether there is a systematic bias, either negative or positive, in decision making related to 
energy consumption. Hartman et al. (1991) empirically examined whether the status quo effect 
posited in prospect theory holds in the consumer valuation of reliable electric service. Though 
reliable electric service is only somewhat related to energy efficiency, they found that the status 
quo effect is significant in this case, suggesting that consumers are irrationally reluctant to move 
from the status quo and accept more likely interruptions in electricity service. 
Empirically testing bounded rationality is even more difficult, for there is no single 
consensus model of bounded rationality in energy decision making (Sanstad & Howarth 1994). 
Friedman & Hausker (1988) developed a theoretical model using a particular structure of 
bounded rationality in which consumers do not have the ability to optimize their energy 
consumption in response to a tiered-rate structure of electricity prices. The model indicates that 
consumers will overconsume energy if the rate structure is increasing and underconsume if it is 
decreasing. Friedman (2002) tested this theoretical model using electric-utility data and exploited 
the increasing block structure of electricity rates to find that the empirical specification 
consistent with bounded rationality (and leading consumers to overconsume electricity) has more 
predictive power than one based on utility maximization. 
Heuristic decision making in energy is similarly difficult to test empirically, although 
several papers in psychology have done so. Kempton & Montgomery (1982) used a survey 
technique to find that consumers use simple heuristic techniques to determine their energy 
consumption, and these techniques systematically lead to underinvestment in energy efficiency. 
For example, Kempton & Montgomery found that, for decisions regarding energy-efficient 
investments, consumers tended to use a simple payback measure where the total investment cost 23 
is divided by the future savings calculated using the energy price today, rather than the price at 
the time of the savings—effectively ignoring future changes in real fuel prices. Kempton et al. 
(1992) used similar methods, finding that consumers systematically miscalculate payback for air 
conditioner investments, again leading to overconsumption of energy. 
Yates & Aronson (1983) found that consumers attach disproportionate weight to the most 
psychologically vivid and observable factors, often called the salience effect. The salience effect 
may influence energy efficiency decisions, potentially contributing to an overemphasis on the 
initial cost of an energy-efficient purchase, leading to an underinvestment in energy efficiency 
(Wilson & Dowlatabadi 2007). This may be related to evidence suggesting that decision makers 
are more sensitive to up-front investment costs than energy operating costs, although this 
evidence may also be the result of inappropriate measures of expectations of future energy use 
and prices (Anderson & Newell 2004, Hassett & Metcalf 1995, Jaffe et al. 1995). 
Loewenstein & Prelec (1992) developed a theoretical model of intertemporal choice that 
replaces the utility function with a value function that is more elastic for outcomes with large 
absolute magnitudes than for outcomes with small magnitudes, consistent with evidence in 
Thaler (1981) and Holcomb & Nelson (1992). Thus, in this value function framework, 
discounting depends on the magnitude of the outcome. Applying this to the case of energy 
efficiency investments, flows of electricity savings are typically smaller than the annual returns 
from other types of investments and thus would be subject to higher rates of discount. 
Loewenstein & Prelec posited that their model may capture a behavioral bias that implies a 
systematic underinvestment in energy efficiency relative to the consumers’ cost-minimizing 
choice. To our knowledge, the model has not been empirically tested in the context of energy 
efficiency. 24 
This review reveals that the empirical literature testing behavioral failures specifically in 
the context of energy decision making is very limited. The literature in psychology and sociology 
discusses these biases further and provides some additional evidence of such biases (e.g., for a 
review of the approaches in the different fields as applied to energy, see Wilson & Dowlatabadi 
2007). The available evidence suggests that systematic biases may exist in consumer decision 
making that could lead to overconsumption of energy and underinvestment in energy efficiency. 
However, more fully understanding the magnitude of these biases, disentangling them from 
informational and other market failures, and measuring the ability of practicable policies to 
address these behavioral failures remain important areas for future research. 
5. ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICY 
Although the literature has identified a number of potential market and behavioral failures that 
are relevant to energy efficiency, for policy responses to improve economic efficiency, they must 
successfully reduce these failures and the associated benefits must exceed the cost of 
implementing the policy. In Section 4, we identified a number of relevant market failures, 
several of which are not unique to energy efficiency and conservation. For example, R&D 
spillovers exist throughout the economy, and motivate general policies such as patent protection, 
R&D tax credits, and basic research funding. Policy decisions specific to energy efficiency R&D 
arise mainly in the context of determining the level and allocation of public-research spending 
among different purposes (for a related discussion, see Newell 2008). LBD spillovers are similar 
in that any emerging technology may exhibit nonappropriable gains from learning, raising 
questions over the appropriate bounds on policy. 
The environmental externalities avoided by energy efficiency and conservation largely 
result from emissions associated with burning fossil fuels. Economic theory suggests that if 25 
consumers are optimizing and there are no other market imperfections, a first-best policy to 
address the environmental externalities would ensure that the external cost from emissions is 
added to the energy price, such as through a Pigouvian tax or cap-and-trade system. The 
resulting internalization of the externality would lead to reduced energy demand (more 
conservation) and more energy efficiency investment.  
To assess the amount of energy savings from such an emissions price policy, one can 
examine the price elasticity of energy demand discussed earlier, which is typically done in the 
context of a computable general equilibrium model or other aggregate energy-economic model. 
In the context of climate policy, such modeling typically finds that a significant portion of cost-
effective emissions reductions are achieved through energy efficiency and conservation, 
alongside renewable energy, nuclear power, and carbon capture and storage applied to coal 
(Clarke et al. 2006, Weyant et al. 2006). Policies to promote energy efficiency directly are 
second-best responses to environmental externalities, however, because they do not discriminate 
among the emissions intensities of different energy sources, do not provide an incentive for 
reducing consumption of energy services, and tend to apply only to a subset of sources. Instead, 
policies to promote energy efficiency may be the appropriate response to demonstrated 
behavioral failures, particularly in contexts where that behavior has broader societal implications 
(e.g., environmental externalities). 
The remaining discussion focuses on the economic rationale, effectiveness, and cost of 
policies that are specifically targeted to energy efficiency grouped into three broad categories: 
information programs, incentives, and product standards. Before turning our attention to these 
issues, we briefly review some generic issues that arise in measuring the effectiveness and cost 26 
of energy efficiency policies. For a more detailed review of these issues, see Gillingham et al. 
(2006). 
5.1 Issues in Measuring Energy Efficiency Policy Effectiveness and Cost 
The literature on energy efficiency and conservation policy evaluation is extensive and has 
become more sophisticated with time. There are a few critical issues common to energy 
efficiency policies. First, ex ante studies dominate much of the energy efficiency policy 
literature, particularly for evaluating product standards. These studies form a valuable starting 
point for understanding future policy, but they do not demonstrate that policies have been 
effective or net beneficial in actual implementation. As more energy efficiency and conservation 
policies have been implemented, the literature is shifting to ex post studies that examine the 
historical effectiveness and cost of energy efficiency and conservation policies in order to 
improve future policy making. 
One of the major criticisms of the energy efficiency and conservation policy evaluation 
literature is that “free riders” are not always properly accounted for. Free riders are consumers 
who would have invested in energy efficiency or conserved energy absent the policy, but who 
receive additional benefits from the policy (Joskow & Marron 1992). Benefits from free riders 
should not be counted in the benefits from the policy, but costs (that are not simply transfers) 
should be included in the costs of the policy. As discussed above, papers in the broader energy 
efficiency literature point to an offsetting effect of “free drivers,” where nonparticipants in the 
program are induced to invest in energy efficiency or conserve energy as a result of having 
observed program participants (Blumstein & Harris 1993, Eto et al. 1996, Geller & Attali 2005). 
Another common criticism of energy efficiency policy evaluations is that they either 
ignore or inappropriately account for the rebound effect, such that energy efficiency 27 
improvements decrease the marginal cost of energy services, thereby increasing demand and 
inducing less-than-proportional reductions in energy use. There is an extensive debate in the 
literature about the importance of the rebound effect in the context of energy efficiency standards 
(for a review, see Gillingham et al. 2006), but some empirical evidence suggests it may be 
numerically small in the case of energy efficiency standards (Dumagan & Mount 1993). For 
example, Davis (2008) examined the case of clothes washers and found a relatively small, but 
not insignificant, rebound effect of -6%. For recent evidence in the household transportation 
context, see Small & Van Dender (2007). 
5.2 Information Programs 
Information programs typically aim to induce energy efficiency investments by providing 
information about potential energy savings or examples of energy savings. Some programs 
attempt to promote energy conservation, particularly for electricity during times when the 
electricity grid is stressed. Historically, many information programs have been part of utility 
demand-side management (DSM) programs, and others have been federal programs such as 
Energy Star, appliance labels, and home energy ratings for new homes. Information programs 
also include programs that provide feedback to consumers about their energy consumption. 
Information programs are motivated by the informational problems and behavioral 
failures noted above. The intention is that, by providing greater and more reliable information, 
issues of uncertain future returns and asymmetric information may be lessened. Additional 
information may also lower the cognitive cost of energy decision making or help guide 
consumers toward better decisions. 
Information programs vary greatly, both in their method and implementation, and 
evidence of their effectiveness is mixed. Weil & McMahon (2003) offered anecdotal evidence 28 
that product labeling requirements can be successful in increasing energy-efficient investments, 
but Levine et al. (1995) found that the Energy Guide product labeling requirements were fairly 
ineffective. The Energy Guide label has been revised in a recent rule made to improve its 
effectiveness. According to some studies, voluntary Energy Star labels appear to have achieved 
significant savings by inducing greater energy efficiency (Webber et al. 2000). For example, 
Howarth et al. (2000) presented evidence that the voluntary Environmental Protection Agency 
Green Lights program (now part of Energy Star) and Energy Star office products program have 
been effective in increasing energy efficiency investments by increasing access to information. 
Anderson & Newell (2004) examined industrial energy audits and found that, although 
plants accept only approximately half of the recommended projects, most plants respond to the 
costs and benefits presented in the energy audits and, with the additional information, adopt 
investments that meet hurdle rates consistent with the standard investment criteria the audited 
firms say they use. Newell et al. (1999) found that the responsiveness of energy-efficient product 
innovation to energy prices increased substantially after product labeling was required. Stern 
(1985) suggested that many early energy conservation information programs (particularly DSM 
programs) were not very effective. Fischer (2008) examined the psychological literature on 
feedback programs (i.e., programs that provide consumers real-time information about their 
electricity consumption) and found feedback induces energy conservation with typical savings of 
5%–12%. Reiss & White (2008) examined data from the 2000–2001 California electricity crisis 
and found that, in times of crisis, conservation appeals and information programs can produce 
sustained reductions in energy demand. Data indicating the cost effectiveness of these programs 
are not readily available. 29 
5.3 Financial Incentives 
Incentive programs provide financial motivation for energy efficiency investments through direct 
subsidies, tax credits, tax deductions, rebates, or loan subsides. Financial incentives have also 
been used to promote energy conservation in the electricity market during times of peak load. In 
addition, financial incentives have been used to encourage the development of new energy 
technologies, such as through prizes for highly energy-efficient products (Gillingham et al. 
2006). Incentive programs have been primarily implemented as part of utility DSM programs. 
These programs are broadly motivated by the concerns mentioned above, in effect responding to 
the perceived underinvestment in energy efficiency by subsidizing such investment. 
The findings from empirical evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives are 
mixed. Stern (1985) suggested financial incentives are not very effective in inducing initial 
interest in energy efficiency improvement programs, but they may help induce energy efficiency 
investments by those already participating in the programs. Using a survey about the 
conservation tax credits of the early 1980s, Carpenter & Chester (1984) found that, although 
86% of those surveyed were aware of the credit, only 35% used it, and of those who used it, 94% 
would have invested anyway. Several studies econometrically estimate the effect of state tax 
incentives on all conservation investments and find mixed results. Hassett & Metcalf (1995) 
attempted to correct previous methodological errors and estimated that a change of 10 percentage 
points in the tax price for energy investment increases the probability of making an energy 
efficiency investment by 24%. Williams & Poyer (1996) also found that despite the free-rider 
issue, tax credits increased the probability of an energy efficiency investment using data on the 
1980s tax credit. These results suggest that financial incentives may be effective, but further 
research is needed to determine their cost effectiveness.  30 
There is a fairly extensive literature examining the cost effectiveness of utility DSM 
programs, which typically contain financial incentives along with information programs. 
Common values in the literature of the “negawatt cost” or the full life-cycle cost (i.e., total 
expense of running the program and installing equipment) per kilowatt-hour saved as a result of 
a DSM program, range from below $0.01/kWh to above $0.20/kWh saved (in real 2002 dollars). 
For comparison, the U.S. average residential electricity price has been in the range of $0.08–
0.09/kWh (in real 2002 dollars) over the past ten years (Energy Information Administration 
2008). A debate in the literature continues regarding negawatt costs, with recent econometric 
evidence by Loughran & Kulick (2004) suggesting utilities are overestimating energy savings, 
thus leading to costs on the high end. However, an analysis on the same data by Auffhammer et 
al. (2008) points out that the savings summary statistic used by Loughran & Kulick (2004) was 
unweighted, and thus in this case, it underestimates the national average of electricity saved per 
dollar spent on DSM programs. Auffhammer et al. (2008) found a weighted average negawatt 
cost in the range of 0.05–0.13 $/kWh based on the model by Loughran and Kulick and failed to 
reject the null hypothesis that the utility-reported savings estimates are correct on average. These 
figures include only costs to the utilities, however, not to the energy end user; consumer costs 
may be in the range of 60–70% of utility costs (Nadel & Geller 1996). Taking utility estimates of 
costs and effectiveness as given, Gillingham et al. (2004) calculated a cost effectiveness for all 
DSM programs of $0.034/kWh (in 2002 dollars) saved in 2000 using only utility costs and utility 
self-reported savings. 
5.4 Product Standards 
Product standards set a minimum level of energy efficiency that all covered products on the 
market must meet. In some cases, standards may be differentiated by size and type of the 31 
product, such as refrigerator standards that may be different for mini fridges than they are for 
full-sized refrigerators. Energy efficiency standards are politically motivated by the full range of 
concerns noted above. From an economic perspective, other policy responses tend to be more 
direct, efficient responses to the market failures described. For example, if consumers are making 
rational decisions and there is heterogeneity in their preferences for energy efficiency, product 
standards could lead to a loss in economic efficiency by forcing behavior change on those who 
gain relatively little from energy efficiency (e.g., those who do not use the product often) 
(Hausman & Joskow 1982). On the other hand, verified behavioral failures could provide an 
economic rationale for product standards. 
The literature on product standards focuses for the most part on appliance standards, for 
which there are primarily ex ante estimates of cost and effectiveness based on government 
regulatory analysis. Using engineering estimates of the energy savings and energy prices, Meyers 
et al. (2003) found a cumulative net benefit of $17.4 billion over 1987–2000 for the 1987–2000 
appliance standards. With projections of future energy savings added, they found a cumulative 
net benefit of the current standards of $154 billion for 1987–2050 (both figures in 2003 dollars). 
Taking these estimates as given, Gillingham et al. (2004) calculated an implied cost effectiveness 
of $0.028/kWh saved in 2000. 
These net-benefit estimates have, to our knowledge, not been subject to independent 
verification in the economic literature. Because these analyses do not include a valuation of 
environmental or security externalities, their net benefits arise solely from implicit modeling 
assumptions that are different from the way consumers behave in the absence of product 
standards (i.e., implicitly modeling behavioral failures). The implication is either that consumers 32 
are not minimizing costs, or that the model is making incorrect assumptions. Further empirical 
research evaluating the degree to which each of these cases is more correct would be valuable. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The literature on the economics of energy efficiency and conservation has embodied significant 
debate over the past few decades, yet many outstanding issues remain. The heart of the debate 
centers on the issues of identifying the economically efficient level of energy efficiency, of 
determining whether policy directed specifically toward energy efficiency is necessary to bring 
us to this level, and, if this is so, of determining its net benefits in practice. We identify potential 
market and behavioral failures that may help to explain this gap, although quantitative evidence 
on the magnitude of many of these potential failures is limited. 
Many of the commonly cited market failures are not unique to energy efficiency, and 
addressing them calls for a much broader policy response, such as an economy-wide price on 
greenhouse gases to address climate change, comprehensive innovation policy to increase 
innovative effort, and electricity market reforms moving toward marginal cost pricing. 
Conversely, information and behavioral failures—to the extent that they are substantial—tend to 
motivate more specific energy efficiency policies, provided that the benefits of the policies 
exceed the costs. Further research in this vein is essential to clarify better the potential for energy 
efficiency policies to increase economic efficiency. 33 
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